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Abstract
In this work we discuss two related cooperative games, relaxed and rigid edge covering games, which arise from edge covering
problems on graphs. On the basis of a new 0–1 program formulation for edge covering problems and LP duality theory, we obtain
a common necessary and sufficient condition on the balancedness of both edge covering games.
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1. Introduction
A cooperative cost game Γ = (N , c) consists of a player set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a characteristic function
c : 2N → R, where for each subset S of N , c(S) represents the cost incurred by the players in S without participation
of others. The central problem in a cooperative game is how to allocate the total cost c(N ) among all the players in
a ‘fair’ way. Different requirements of fairness and rationality result in different solution concepts, e.g., the core, the
Shapley value and the nucleolus. The core is the most important solution concept, that has attracted much attention
from researchers. The core of a game Γ = (N , c) is defined by
Core(Γ ) = {x ∈ Rn : x(N ) = c(N ) and x(S) ≤ c(S),∀S ⊆ N },
where x(S) =∑i∈S xi for S ⊆ N . A game is called balanced if its core is nonempty.
In this work, we study two cooperative game models arising from edge covering problems in graph theory. Given
a graph G = (V, E;ω) with edge weight function ω : E → R+, the edge covering problem is finding a subset
K ⊆ E such that every vertex v ∈ V is incident to at least one edge in K and it minimizes the total cost of its edges.
We assume that each vertex is a player, who wants to obtain some kind of service through an edge cover. From the
authority’s point of view, he/she wishes to minimize the total cost for providing the service to every player. This is just
the edge covering problem on graph G. On the other hand, a related problem is how to allocate the total cost among
all the players when they are satisfied by the service. We shall introduce two related cooperative games, relaxed and
rigid edge covering games, to model the cost allocation problem.
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The relaxed edge covering game was first discussed by Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [1]. In this game, each
subset of players is allowed to obtain the service (i.e., edge covering) via any edge of the graph, while for the rigid
edge covering game, we give a further restriction: each subset of players is allowed to obtain the service only by
making use of the edges in its induced subgraph. In spite of the difference between them, we show that the conditions
on the balancedness of the two games are equivalent. The main approach in this work is Lagrange dual and duality
theorem of linear programming, which is motivated by Velzen’s work on dominating set games [4] and Goemans and
Skutella’s work on facility location games [2].
The work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the definitions and some known results. Section 3 is
dedicated to a characterization of the core for a rigid edge covering game. In Section 4, equivalent conditions on the
balancedness of the two edge covering games are given.
2. Definitions of edge covering games
Let G = (V, E;ω) be an undirected graph with edge weight function ω : E → R+. Without loss of generality,
we assume G is connected. An edge cover of graph G is a set K ⊆ E such that for each vertex v ∈ V , there exists an
edge e ∈ K incident to it. The edge covering problem is finding a minimum weighted edge cover of G, i.e., an edge
cover that minimizes the total cost of its edges. The cost of a minimum weighted edge cover is denoted by γ (G, ω).
For S ⊆ V , let G[S] denote the subgraph induced by S, and ωS denote the edge weight function restricted to the edge
set of G[S].
Definition. Let G = (V, E;ω) be an edge weighted graph.
The rigid edge covering game Γ = (V, c) corresponding to graph G is defined by:
(a) The player set is V .
(b) For each S ⊆ V , c(S) =
{
γ (G[S], ωS ) G[S] has no isolated vertex
+∞ otherwise.
The relaxed edge covering game Γ˜ = (V, c˜) corresponding to graph G is defined by:
(a) The player set is V .
(b) For each S ⊆ V, c˜(S) = min{γ (G[T ], ωT ) : T ⊇ S}.
Since in the relaxed edge covering game, subset S ⊂ V has more possibilities in choosing edges to cover it,
we have c˜(S) ≤ c(S), while for the set V of all players, it has the same possibilities in the two games, that is,
c˜(V ) = c(V ) = γ (G, ω). This implies that Core(Γ˜ ) ⊆ Core(Γ ). Furthermore, we prove that Core(Γ˜ ) coincides with
the nonnegative part of Core(Γ ).
Theorem 2.1. Let Γ = (V, c) and Γ˜ = (V, c˜) be the rigid and relaxed edge covering games corresponding to graph
G = (V, E;ω), respectively. Then Core(Γ˜ ) = Core(Γ ) ∩ Rn+, where n = |V |.
Proof. As noted above, it holds that Core(Γ˜ ) ⊆ Core(Γ ). We then show that Core(Γ˜ ) ⊆ Rn+. Let z =
(z1, z2, . . . , zn) ∈ Core(Γ˜ ). For any S ⊆ T ⊆ V , we have c˜(S) ≤ c˜(T ). It follows that zi = c˜(V ) −∑ j∈V \{i} z j ≥
c˜(V )− c˜(V \ {i}) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ V . Therefore, Core(Γ˜ ) ⊆ Core(Γ ) ∩ Rn+.
On the other hand, let z ∈ Core(Γ ) ∩ Rn+, and S ⊆ V be such that c˜(S) < c(S). Obviously, the subset S can save
cost by using edges not in G[S]. Let K ⊆ E be a subset such that: (a) each vertex in S is incident to at least one edge
in K ; and (b)
∑
e∈K ωe = c˜(S). Denote by T the set of all vertices incident to edges in K . Then we have T ⊇ S and
c(T ) = c˜(S); it follows that
z(S) ≤ z(T ) ≤ c(T ) = c˜(S),
where the first inequality holds because z ≥ 0 and the second inequality holds because z ∈ Core(Γ ). That is,
z ∈ Core(Γ˜ ), implying that Core(Γ ) ∩ Rn+ ⊆ Core(Γ˜ ). 
The relaxed edge covering game is included in the class of combinatorial optimization games introduced by Deng,
Ibaraki and Nagamochi [1]. They investigated the characterization of the core, and gave a sufficient and necessary
condition on the balancedness of a relaxed edge covering game. Given a graph G = (V, E;ω), the incidence matrix
of G, denoted by A = [ai j ], is a |V | × |E |-matrix with the rows indexed by vertices and the columns indexed by
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edges, in which ai j = 1 if the i th vertex is incident to the j th edge, and ai j = 0 otherwise. Thus, the edge covering
problem can be formulated as the following 0–1 program:
(IP1) : γ (G, ω) = min{ωx : Ax ≥ 1, x ∈ {0, 1}|E |}. (2.1)
Here, ω is a |E |-dimensional row vector with each component corresponding to the edge weight in E , and 1 is a
|V |-dimensional column vector with each component being 1. Consider its LP relaxation (LP1) and the dual program
(DLP1):
(LP1) : min{ωx : Ax ≥ 1, x ≥ 0}; (DLP1) : max{y1 : yA ≤ ω, y ≥ 0}. (2.2)
Theorem 2.2 (Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [1]). Let Γ˜ = (V, c˜) be the relaxed edge covering game corresponding
to graph G = (V, E;ω). Then Core(Γ˜ ) 6= ∅ if and only if there is no integrality gap for the relaxation (LP1). In such
a case, a vector z ∈ Core(Γ˜ ) if and only if it is an optimal solution to (DLP1).
3. Balancedness of rigid edge covering games
In this section, we focus on the characterization for the core of a rigid edge covering game. We first introduce some
notation. Given a graph G = (V, E), let E〈v〉 denote the set of edges incident to vertex v, V 〈e〉 denote the set of the
two vertices incident to edge e, and E[v, S] denote the set of edges with one vertex v and the other vertex in S. For
each v ∈ V , its open neighborhood is denoted by N (v) = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}. For S ⊆ N (v), the subgraph with
vertex set S ∪ {v} and edge set E[v, S] is called a v-substar, and v is called the center.
It is easy to verify that any minimum edge cover of G can be partitioned into some vertex-disjoint substars. We
shall make use of this intuitive result to obtain the core characterization for rigid edge covering games.
Lemma 3.1. Let Γ = (V, c) be the rigid edge covering game corresponding to graph G = (V, E;ω). Then
z ∈ Core(Γ ) if and only if ∀v ∈ V and ∀S ⊆ N (v) it holds that z(S ∪ {v}) ≤∑e∈E[v,S] ωe, and z(V ) = c(V ).
Proof. First we show the “only if” part. Let z ∈ Core(Γ ). Since ∀v ∈ V and S ⊆ N (v), E[v, S] is an edge cover of
G[S ∪ {v}], it follows that z(S ∪ {v}) ≤ c(S ∪ {v}) ≤∑e∈E[v,S] ωe.
Now we show the “if” part. We just need to show that for each T ⊆ V , z(T ) ≤ c(T ). If G[T ] has at least one
isolated vertex, then c(T ) = +∞, and z(T ) ≤ c(T ) is obviously true. Otherwise, let K be a minimum weighted
edge cover of G[T ], i.e., c(T ) = ∑e∈K ωe. Because K must consist of some vertex-disjoint substars, we pick one
center for each such substar. Denote by u1, u2, . . . , ul the picked centers, and S1, S2, . . . , Sl the vertex sets of the
corresponding substars. Then z(T ) =∑li=1 z(Si ) ≤∑li=1∑e∈E[ui ,Si\{ui }] ωe =∑e∈K ωe = c(T ). 
To establish a sufficient and necessary condition on the balancedness of a rigid edge covering game, we establish
a new 0–1 program formulation to model the edge covering problem. Given an edge weighted graph G = (V, E;ω)
with V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}, two types of binary variables are introduced:
yi =
{
1 edge ei is chosen to the edge cover
0 otherwise i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
xi j =
{
1 edge ei is chosen to cover vertex v j
0 otherwise i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then the edge covering problem can be formulated as the following 0–1 program:
(IP2) :








xi j = 1 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
xi j ≤ yi i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n
xi j , yi ∈ {0, 1} i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(3.1)
In this formulation, the set of constraints
∑
ei∈E〈v j 〉 xi j = 1 ( j = 1, 2, . . . , n) ensures that every vertex chooses
exactly one edge to ‘cover’ it. Since there are no items of xi j in the objective function, these constraints are equivalent
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to the constraints
∑
ei∈E〈v j 〉 xi j ≥ 1. The second set of constraints xi j ≤ yi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) ensures
that each vertex can only be covered by an edge which has been chosen to be the edge cover. Replacing the discrete










xi j = 1 j = 1, 2, . . . , n
xi j ≤ yi i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n
xi j , yi ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(3.2)
On the other hand, we consider the cost allocation problem (CAP) with respect to the core of the rigid edge covering









z j ≤ c(S) S ⊆ V .
(3.3)
It is obvious that Core(Γ ) 6= ∅ if and only if the optimal value of (CAP) is equal to c(V ) = γ (G, ω), and in such
a case each optimal solution to (CAP) lies in Core(Γ ). In the next theorem, we shall develop a strong connection
between the LP relaxation (LP2) (3.2) and the cost allocation problem (CAP) (3.3).
Theorem 3.2. For the rigid edge covering game Γ = (V, c) corresponding to graph G = (V, E;ω), the cost
allocation problem (CAP) is equivalent to the dual program of (LP2). In particular, Core(Γ ) 6= ∅ if and only if
there is no integrality gap for the LP relaxation (LP2).
Proof. We introduce a vector z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) with each dual variable z j corresponding to the constraint∑
































v j∈V 〈ei 〉




s.t. 0 ≤ xi j ≤ yi i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(3.4)
According to strong duality theorems [3], the Lagrange dual (LD) (3.4) is equivalent to the dual program of (LP2),
and it has the same optimal value as (LP2).
For a fixed vector z, the inner minimization problem of (LD) is either unbounded or has an optimal solution
xi j = yi = 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n)with the minimum value of (LD) being∑nj=1 z j . Moreover, the inner
minimization problem is unbounded if and only if there exists a vertex v j∗ ∈ V and a subset S ⊆ N (v j∗) such that∑
ei∈E[v j∗ ,S]
ωi − z(S ∪ {v j∗}) < 0. (3.5)
In fact, if the statement of (3.5) holds, then we can construct a feasible solution of (LD) as follows (M > 0 is a
sufficiently large constant):
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∗ , S] and v j ∈ V 〈ei 〉 \ {v j∗};
xi∗ j∗ = M, ei∗ is an arbitrary edge fixed in E[v j∗ , S];
yi = xi j = 0, otherwise.
And the objective value of this feasible solution is [∑ei∈E[v j∗ ,S] ωi − z(S ∪ {v j∗})]M < 0. This implies that the
inner minimization problem is unbounded. On the other hand, if
∑
ei∈E[v j ,S] ωi − z(S ∪ {v j }) ≥ 0 for each vertex
v j ∈ V and each subset S ⊆ N (v j ), then by the constraints 0 ≤ xi j ≤ yi , it is easy to verify that xi j = yi = 0 (i =
1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) must be an optimal solution to the inner minimization problem of (LD).





s.t. z(S ∪ {v j }) ≤
∑
ei∈E[v j ,S]
ωi j = 1, 2, . . . , n and S ⊆ N (v j ).
(3.6)
According to Lemma 3.1, z ∈ Core(Γ ) if and only if z(S ∪ {v j }) ≤∑ei∈E[v j ,S] ωi for each v j ∈ V and S ⊆ N (v j ).
This means the linear program (3.6), i.e., the Lagrange dual (LD), is the same as the cost allocation problem (CAP).
The second part of the theorem follows from the fact that all the optimal values of linear programs (CAP), (LD)
and (LP2) are equal. 









v j∈V 〈ei 〉
ti j ≤ ωi i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
z j − ti j ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n and ei ∈ E〈v j 〉
ti j ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(3.7)
By Theorem 3.2 and the duality theorem of linear programming, (DLP2) (3.7) is equivalent to the cost allocation
problem (CAP) (3.3). This yields the following result.
Corollary 3.3. Let Γ = (V, c) be the rigid edge covering game corresponding to graph G = (V, E;ω). When
Core(Γ ) 6= ∅, a vector z ∈ Core(Γ ) if and only if (z, t) is an optimal solution to (DLP2) for some completion t of z.
4. Equivalence on balancedness of edge covering games
In this section the equivalence on the balancedness of both rigid and relaxed edge covering games will be given.
That is to say, if one of the edge covering games possesses a core element, then the other possesses a core element as
well.
For the edge covering problem on graph G = (V, E;ω), we have two integer program formulations, (IP1) given
in (2.1) and (IP2) given in (3.1). Although they are in different shapes, their equivalence can be easily verified.
Lemma 4.1. Integer program (IP1) and its LP relaxation (LP1) are equivalent to integer program (IP2) and its LP
relaxation (LP2), respectively. In particular, each integer optimal solution to (LP1) can yield an integer optimal
solution to (LP2), and vice versa.
Combining this lemma with Theorems 2.2 and 3.2, we have:
Theorem 4.2. Let Γ = (V, c) and Γ˜ = (V, c˜) be the rigid and relaxed edge covering games corresponding to graph
G = (V, E;ω), respectively. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) Γ = (V, c) is balanced;
(2) Γ˜ = (V, c˜) is balanced;
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(3) LP relaxation (LP1) has an integer optimal solution;
(4) LP relaxation (LP2) has an integer optimal solution.
In general, it is NP-hard to determine whether the LP relaxation (LP1) or (LP2) has integer optimal solutions.
That is, it is NP-hard to test whether the core of the relaxed or rigid edge covering game is nonempty. However,
given the information that the core is nonempty, it is easy to compute a core allocation and to check whether a given
cost allocation belongs to the core for both games.
Theorem 4.3. Let Γ = (V, c) and Γ˜ = (V, c˜) be the rigid and relaxed edge covering games corresponding to graph
G = (V, E;ω), respectively. If Core(Γ ) 6= ∅ or Core(Γ˜ ) 6= ∅, then a core allocation can be computed in polynomial
time and it can be checked in polynomial time whether a given allocation belongs to the core for both games.
Proof. For the relaxed game Γ˜ , the result follows directly from Theorem 2.2. For the rigid game Γ , Corollary 3.3
implies that the problem of computing a core allocation can be reduced to computing an optimal solution to the dual
linear program (DLP2), and the problem of checking whether a vector z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) is a core allocation of Γ
can be reduced to checking whether
∑n
j=1 z j equals the optimal value of (LP2) and whether the constraints of (DLP2)
(the values of z1, z2, . . . , zn are fixed) has a feasible solution t . 
References
[1] X. Deng, T. Ibaraki, H. Nagamochi, Algorithmic aspects of the core of combinatorial optimization games, Math. Oper. Res. 24 (1999) 751–766.
[2] M.X. Goemans, M. Skutella, Cooperative facility location games, J. Algorithms 50 (2004) 194–214.
[3] G.L. Nemhauser, L.A. Wolsey, Integer and Combinatorial Optimization, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1988.
[4] B.V. Velzen, Dominating set game, Oper. Res. Lett. 32 (2004) 565–573.
